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LEAD ARTICLES
THE FAILURE TO PROTECT CULTURAL
PROPERTY IN WARTIME
David Keane*
INTRODUCTION
"All art is quite useless."
"The only excuse for making a useless thing is that
one admires it intensely."
- Oscar Wilde, 'The Picture of Dorian Gray'
The notion that certain properties should not be attacked during
wartime dates back to antiquity. Today, the need for protection is
greater than ever. Cultural property has increasingly become a
deliberate focus of attack. World Wars I and II, as well as the
recent conflict in the former Yugoslavia, have led to the
development of international law and the codification of protection
for cultural property. However, these major developments in
international law are reactionary in nature; they are a response to
instances of grave damage to cultural property. Every time the
protection has increased, this increase has subsequently proven
inadequate.
This paper will chart the development of the protection of
cultural property during armed conflict. It will adopt a
chronological approach, in order to highlight the reactionary nature
of the international rules. Section I will examine the development
* Ph.D. Candidate, Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of
Ireland, Galway, LLM (NUI Galway), BCL (Law and French), University
College Cork, Ireland. The author wishes to acknowledge the funding received
from the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences in the
form of a research scholarship.
1 OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY (James Sullivan Publisher)
(1890).
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from the Lieber Code and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907 to World Wars I and II and the trial of the major German war
criminals by the International Military Tribunal (hereinafter
"IMT"). Section II will study in detail the 1954 Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict. Section III will look at the effectiveness of the protection
afforded by the 1954 Hague Convention in light of the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia. Section IV will examine the 1999 Second
Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention (hereinafter "Second
Protocol"). This paper will demonstrate that while the international
rules evolve and strengthen, the destruction of cultural property
continues. This paper will seek to understand why this is, and
what, if anything, can be done to prevent it
SECTION I.
A. Historical Development of Protection for Cultural Property
An awareness of harm to cultural property dates back to
antiquity. The Greek historian Herodotus described the destruction
of a temple by the Persian Army in 480 B.C.:
At the last-named place there was a temple of
Apollo, very rich, and adorned with a vast number
of treasures and offerings. There was likewise an
oracle there in those days, as indeed there is at the
present time. This temple the Persians plundered
and burnt.. .for the purpose of.. .conveying to King
Xerxes the riches which were there laid up.2
In the eighteenth century, Emiric de Vattel wrote that:
For whatever cause a country is ravaged, we ought
2. HERODOTUS, 'THE PERSIAN WARS', BOOK VIII - URANIA 8.33-8.35 (G.
Rawlinson trans., The Modem Library: New York 1942).
[Vol. XIV: 1
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to spare those edifices which do honor to human
society, and do not contribute to increase the
enemy's strength - such as temples, tombs, public
buildings, and all works of remarkable beauty.
What advantage is obtained by destroying them? It
is declaring one's self an enemy to mankind, thus
wantonly to deprive them of these monuments of
art and models of taste.. .We still detest those
barbarians who destroyed so many wonders of art,
when they overran the Roman Empire.'
These writings were only the seeds of the development of
customary international law prohibiting the destruction of cultural
property.
During the Napoleonic conquests, art treasures were stolen
rather than destroyed. Napoleon attempted to legalize his looting
by providing for the taking of Italian art in the treaties imposed
upon the surrendering Italians.4 Following Napoleon's final defeat
at Waterloo, France was ordered to return stolen art treasures
under the Treaty of Paris, signed on November 20, 1815.
The first codified reference to cultural property is found in the
Manual of the Laws and Customs of War, or Lieber Code, of 1863,
which was created for the U.S. military.5 Article 35 of the Lieber
Code states that "classical works of art, libraries, scientific
collections, or precise instruments.. .must be secured against all
available injury. '"6 Article 34 of the Code creates the general rule
that cultural property should be treated as private property unless it
3. EMIRIC DE VATTEL, LES DROIT DES GENS, OU, PRINCIPES DE LA Lol
NATURELLE, APPLIQUE A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES
SOUVERAINS 168 (1758).
4. PROCTOR PATTERSON JONES, NAPOLEON: AN INTIMATE ACCOUNT OF THE
YEARS OF SUPREMACY 1800-1814 257 (Proctor Jones 1992).
5 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., Originally Issued as General Orders No.
100, Adjutant General's Office, 1863, Washington 1898:
Government Printing Office.
6. Id.
2004]
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is used for a military purpose.7 The Lieber Code places the duty of
protecting cultural property on both the attacker and the defender.
The first formal international treaties providing for the
protection of cultural property during wartime were the Hague
Regulations of 18998 and 1907. Article 27 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land
provides that "all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as
possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or charitable
purposes, historic monuments.. .provided they are not being used
for military purposes."'" The presence of such buildings is to be
indicated by visible signs." Article 56 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations provides that:
[t]he property of municipalities, that of institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts
and sciences, even when State property, shall be
treated as private property. All seizure of,
destruction or willful damage done to institutions of
this character, historic monuments, works of art, is
forbidden, and shall be made subject to legal
proceedings. 2
The reference to State property as private property is a principle
7. Article 34 of the Lieber Code of 1863 states as a general rule: the property
belonging to.. establishments of education.. .whether public schools,
universities, academies of learning or observatories, museums of the fine arts, or
of scientific character... such property is not to be considered public property
[available for seizure].
8. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.
The Hague, July 29, 1899.
9. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The
Hague, October 18, 1907.
10. Id.
11. Id. at art. 27.
12. Id. at art. 56.
[Vol. XIV: I
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taken from the Lieber Code. 3 However, the Lieber Code allows
for the removal of cultural property by a belligerent force and the
settlement of its ownership in the subsequent peace treaty.1 4 This
policy was rejected in Article 56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations in
favor of allowing the unassailable ownership of cultural property
by the State and its citizens. 5 In addition, Article 56 also allows
for legal proceedings in the event of seizure of, destruction or
willful damage done to cultural property.'
6
The 1907 Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs
of War on Land expanded the legal protection of cultural property.
More significantly, the Hague Regulations were considered part of
customary international law by the IMT at Nuremberg, and
binding even on States that had not ratified them.'7 Therefore, the
IMT at Nuremberg marks the beginning of the customary
protection of cultural property. 18 The Hague Regulations legally
13. Article 34 of the Lieber Code of 1863 states as a general rule: the
property belonging to churches, to hospitals, or other establishments of an
exclusively charitable character, to establishments of education, or foundations
for the promotion of knowledge, whether public schools, universities, academies
of learning or observatories, museums of the fine arts, or of a scientific character
such property is not to be considered public property in the sense of paragraph
31.
14. Article 36 of the Lieber Code of 1863 states as a general rule: if such
works of art, libraries, collections, or instruments belonging to a hostile nation
or government, can be removed without injury, the ruler of the conquering state
or nation may order them to be seized and removed for the benefit of the said
nation. The ultimate ownership is to be settled by the ensuing treaty of peace.
15. Convention (IV), supra note 9, at art. 56 (the property of municipalities,
that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and
sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private property. All
seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this character,
historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden).
16. Id.
17. The Trial of German Major War Criminals before the International
Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, November 14, 1945 to
October 1, 1946, 241, available at http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/ (last
visited Feb. 22, 2004).
18. The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Judgment, September 30,
1946 - 1 October 1946. 'The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity'; [I]t is argued that the Hague Convention does not apply in this case
2004]
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entrenched three core principles pertaining to international
conflicts. 9 First, artistic, religious and scientific property was to be
immune from attack unless employed for military purposes.2" Such
properties were to be marked with visible symbols. Second, this
principle was qualified by the requirement of military necessity."
Third, an occupying power could not destroy, damage, loot or
plunder cultural property. Cultural objects and structures were to
be treated as private property. Violations of the Hague Regulations
were subject to international sanctions.2
The 1907 Hague Regulations failed to protect cultural property
during World War I and as a result, the ineffectiveness of the
international law contributed to a cycle of failures. The bombing of
the cathedral at Rheims, the burning of the library at the Belgian
University of Louvain, the looting of museums, churches and
libraries all serve as examples of the futility of the Regulations
because of the "general participation" clause in Article 2 of the Hague
Convention of 1907.. .In the opinion of the Tribunal it is not necessary to decide
this question. The rules of land warfare expressed in the Convention
undoubtedly represented an advance over existing international law at the time
of their adoption. But the Convention expressly stated that it was an attempt "to
revise the general laws and customs of war" which it thus recognized to be then
existing, but by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were recognized
by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and
customs of war.
19. Matthew Lippman, Art and Ideology in the Third Reich: The Protection
of Cultural Property and the Humanitarian Law of War, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1,
10-14 (1998).
20. Convention (IV), supra note 9, at art. 27, available at
http://www.lib.byu.edu/-rdh/wwi/hague/hague5.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2004) (in sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare,
as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military
purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings
or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy
beforehand).
21. Id. at art. 23(g) (it is especially forbidden [t]o destroy or seize the
enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war).
22. Article 56, supra note 15.
[Vol. XIV: I
6
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23during the war.
After World War I, there were extensive reparations for the
damage caused by the Germans provided for in Pact VII of the
Treaty of Versailles. 24  Article 245 of the Treaty of Versailles
states that the German Government "must restore to the French
Government the trophies, archives, historical souvenirs or works
of art carried away from France by the German authorities in the
course of the war of 1870 to 1871 and during this last war."25 The
Germans were ordered to return the original Koran of the Caliph
Othman, which was removed from Medina by the Turkish
authorities, and the skull of the Sultan Mkwawa, which was
removed from the Protectorate of German East Africa, to the King
of the Hedjaz.26 Article 247 of the Treaty commissioned a
rebuilding of the collection of the burnt library at Louvain. Article
247 also provides for the return of two Belgian works of art,
namely, the leaves of the triptych of the Mystic Lamb painted by
the Van Eyck brothers and the leaves of the triptych of the Last S
23. PATRICK J. BOYLAN, REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT (1993).
24. The Treaty of Versailles (July 1919) brought a formal end to World War
I. The victorious allies (Great Britain, France and the United States) imposed
severe terms on defeated Germany. These included: a substantial loss of
territory, heavy reparations to be paid to the victors, a much reduced army and
navy, and no air force. The Rhineland, which bordered France, was to be
demilitarized, and Germany was forbidden from uniting with Austria. Above all
Germany was compelled to admit sole responsibility for starting the war. The
Treaty, when its terms were revealed, caused an outcry across the entire political
spectrum in Germany. It was blamed for all the ills that affected Germany in the
1920's and was seen as a key factor in the rise of Nazism. In the 1920's and
1930's even commentators in France and Britain believed the terms of the
Treaty were too harsh. However recent scholarship has challenged this view,
and argues that the Treaty was a reasonable settlement, which aimed to punish,
but not destroy, Germany. The problems of the 1920's stemmed from
Germany's failure to acknowledge that it had posed a severe threat to European
peace in the years before 1914, and that it had caused, and lost, the most
devastating war in history, leaving millions dead and injured. See MacMillan,
Margaret, 'Peacemakers', John Murray, London, 2001.
25. The Peace Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 245 (Special
Provisions).
26. Id. at art. 246.
2004]
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upper painted by Dierick Bouts. 7
Although no German was ever prosecuted for damage to cultural
property during World War I, such destruction was clearly
condemned as a violation of the 'humanitarian' laws of war. The
principle of protection from the Hague Regulations of 1899 and
1907 was given practical effect in the Treaty of Versailles, and the
restitution of cultural property following World War I represents
an important advancement.
B. World War II and the Trial ofAlfred Rosenberg
Alfred Rosenberg was responsible for a system of organized
plunder of both public and private property throughout the invaded
countries of Europe during World War II. Acting under Hitler's
orders of January 1940 to set up the 'Hohe Schule', Rosenberg
organized and directed the Special Purpose Staff, or 'Einsatzstab
Rosenberg' (hereinafter "Einsatzstab"), which plundered museums
and libraries, confiscated art treasures and collections and pillaged
private houses. By July 14, 1944, the Einsatzstab seized more than
21,903 art objects including famous paintings and museum
pieces."8
Rosenberg's trial by the IMT at Nuremberg in 1946 highlighted
the extensive and systematic removal of cultural property by the
German Reich from occupied territories in Eastern and Western
Europe during World War II. As head of the Einsatzstab,
Rosenberg drew up catalogues of the thousands of pieces of art
brought to Germany. These catalogues were detailed in documents
submitted to the IMT, and included some 21,000 artistic
treasures.29
27. Lippman, supra note 19, pt. VI (both pieces had, however, been acquired
legitimately by German museums).
28. Major General Nikitchenko, Judgment of the International Military
Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, The Defendants: Rosenberg, available at
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/judgment/j-defendants-rosenberg.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
29. The Trial of German Major War Criminals Sitting at Nuremberg,
Germany, January 9, 1946, 124, Exhibit USA 385 (the Exhibit also detailed the
[Vol. XIV: 1
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Hitler appointed Rosenberg Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories on July 17, 1941, which included the Soviet
region.3" The Soviet Prosecution at the Nuremburg trial accused
the Einsatzstab of the plunder of cultural property in the Soviet
region." Many of the arguments in the IMT focused on the
Prosecution's contention that the Einsatzstab was created as "a
matter of a long-range plan for the plundering of cultural treasures
of other States."32 Furthermore, the Soviet Prosecution argued that
the Germans tried to establish a "new order" as to culture, art and
science.33 Rosenberg contended throughout the trial that any
property removed from the Occupied Territories was done in order
to keep it safe from damage.34 He pointed to an order of the Army
High Command of September 1942 that stated that, "except for
special cases, in which the safeguarding of endangered works of
culture is urgent, efforts will be made to leave them in their present
location for the time being."35 The same order granted the
Einsatzstab the authority to safeguard works of culture against
damage or destruction in the operational area of Eastern Europe.36
The Prosecution also examined the removal of furniture from
Jewish homes in France,37 and the diversion of confiscated art
treasures by Hitler and Goering into their own collections.
Rosenberg cited Article 279 of the Treaty of Versailles as a
justification for the removal of furniture from Jewish homes in
France.38 Rosenberg stated "the Chief French Prosecutor declared
at this trial that the Versailles Treaty was based on the Hague
looting of the contents of 71,000 Jewish homes in France).
30. Nikitchenko, supra note 28.
31. The Trial of German Major War Criminals, April 16, 1946, Direct
Examination of Alfred Rosenberg by Dr. Thomas, 23, Doc 161 - PS, available
at http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc- 12/tgmwc- 12-109-01.shtml
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
32. Id. at 27.
33. Id. (Exhibit USSR 39, 1).
34. Id. (Exhibit USA 85, Doc 1015-PS).
35. Idat 10.
36. Id.
37. The Trial of German Major War Criminals, supra note 31, at 27.
38. Id. at 7.
2004]
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Convention. Therefore, I drew the conclusion that this measure
against a very distinct category of citizens appeared to be as
justified and to have as much international legal sanction as the
measure of the Allies during the 1914 - 1918 war."39 However,
Rosenberg admitted that he was aware that this was "a serious
encroachment on private property."
At Nuremberg, Rosenberg did not deny that the art treasures
were channeled into Hitler and Goering's private collections.
Rosenberg argued that Goering did not intend to keep his
collection, but would presently return it to the German Reich.4 He
stated that the Reich Marshal "utilized" these works of art,
contrary to the claim of the French Prosecution that he
"misappropriated" them.42 He admitted to being "uneasy" because
he was responsible for the cataloging and any potential negotiating
concerning these works.43 The diversion of art treasures was raised
again during Goering's trial. The Prosecution pointed to the Nazis'
hierarchy or list of priorities for the disposal of works of art from
the Louvre which was: (1) works of art which the Fuhrer reserved
for himself the decision as to their use, (2) works of art which
completed Goering's collection, (3) works of art and library stocks
that would be useful in establishing higher institutions of learning,
and (4) works of art suitable for German museums.44 In light of the
high priority afforded by the order to the completion of Goering's
own collection, it is not surprising that Goering continued to aid
the operations of the Einsatzstab. Thus Goering's responsibility for
the planning of the looting of art, which was actually accomplished
by the Einsatzstab, is clear.45
39. Id.
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id. at 10; "I knew that Reich Marshal Goering intended later to give this
collection to the German Reich and not to retain it for himself'.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The Trial of German Major War Criminals, January 8, 1946, available at
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc- 12/tgmwc- 12-109-01.shtml (last
visited Feb. 22, 2004).
45. Id.
[Vol. XIV: I
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On May 8, 1941, Rosenberg prepared instructions for all Reich
Commissioners in the Occupied Eastern Territories. The last
paragraph of the instructions stated "from the point of view of
cultural policy, the German Reich is in a position to promote and
direct national culture and science in many fields. It will be
necessary that in some territories an uprooting and resettlement of
various racial stocks will have to be effected."46 The damaging of
the three-hundred-year-old University of Dorpat in Riga, Latvia,
was said by Rosenberg to be "the result of warfare."47 He claimed
to have removed cultural objects only when fighting made it
necessary.48 Yet, he seized Jewish cultural objects under the claim
of constructing a collection of Judaica.49 Paintings and art were
taken from Kiev and Kharkov in the Ukraine, and the palaces of
Peterhof, Tsarskoge Selo and Pavlovsk ° The value of art taken
from Bellarussia alone ran into several millions of dollars. Based
on the aforementioned history of Nazi activities, one can surmise
that the intention was to enrich the artistic collection of the Third
Reich, not to safeguard these cultural objects."
The IMT declared Rosenberg responsible for "a system of
organized plunder of both public and private property throughout
the invaded countries of Europe."52 The judgment of the IMT
found Rosenberg guilty of the organization and direction of pillage
and plunder as part of a policy of Germanisation 3 It found that
Rosenberg directed that the Hague Rules of Land Warfare were
not applicable in the Occupied Eastern Territories. 4 The
Einsatzstab plundered museums and libraries, confiscated art
treasures and collections, and pillaged private houses.
46. Id. (Exhibit USA 144, Doc 1030-PS).
47. The Trial of German Major War Criminals, supra note 29.
48. Id.
49. Lippman, supra note 19, at pt. VII.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Judgment of the IMT available at
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/judgment/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
53. Nikitchenko, supra note 28.
54. Id.
2004]
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Furthermore, its own reports show the extent of the confiscations.
The IMT found Rosenberg guilty of war crimes and crimes against
humanity relating to cultural property, as well as crimes against
peace and the waging of aggressive war.5 He was sentenced to
death and executed at Nuremberg on the morning of October 16,
1946.
SECTION II
A. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict
The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict (hereinafter "1954 Hague Convention")
was adopted at the Hague on May 14, 1954. The Hague
Convention is considered by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (hereinafter "UNESCO") to
be a sequel to the fourth Hague Convention, particularly the Laws
and Customs of War on Land of 1907.56 The Preamble of the 1954
Hague Convention describes the cultural internationalist approach
of the Convention and outlines cultural property as the "heritage of
mankind., 57 The 1954 Hague Convention is a reaction to the
events of World War II. It recognizes that "cultural property has
suffered grave damage during recent armed conflicts"58 and seeks
to address the inadequacies of the 1907 Hague Regulations in light
of the systematic plunder of cultural property by the Nazis.
55. Judgment of the IMT, supra note 52. See also Lippman, supra note 19
(the Court's wide-ranging discussion of the defendant's activities makes it
difficult to determine whether their acts of economic confiscation and
discrimination were considered to constitute crimes against humanity as well as
war crimes).
56. Conventions and Recommendations of UNESCO Concerning the
Protection of the Cultural Heritage, 'Introduction to the Hague Convention', 7-
8.
57. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, Preamble, 14 May 1954.
58. Id.
[Vol. XIV: I
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Article 1 of the 1954 Hague Convention defines cultural
property as:
moveable or immoveable property of great
importance to the cultural heritage of every people,
such as monuments of architecture, art or history,
whether religious or secular; archaeological sites;
groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of
historical or artistic interest; works of art;
manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic,
historical or archaeological interest; as well as
scientific collections and important collections of
books or archives or of reproductions of the
property defined above. 9
The protection of cultural property involves the safeguarding of
and respect for such property. Safeguarding places an obligation
on High Contracting Parties in times of peace to protect their
cultural property against the foreseeable effects of an armed
conflict.6' The obligation on High Contracting Parties to respect
cultural property applies within their own territory as well as
within the territory of other Parties to the 1954 Hague
Convention. 62 The 1954 Hague Convention State Parties must
refrain from using cultural property for purposes that are likely to
expose it to damage in the event of armed conflict, and from
directing any act of hostility against such property. Article 4
Paragraph 2 states that these obligations "may be waived only in
cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a
59. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215, available at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/hague/html-eng/page2.shtml#General%20p
rvisions- (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
60. High Contracting Parties are the signatories to a treaty who agree to be
bound by the treaty's rules.
61. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 59, at art.
3.
62. Id. at art. 4.
20041
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waiver.""
The Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention is a clear reaction
to the events of World War II. Article I of the Protocol prohibits
the exportation of cultural property from a territory occupied by a
High Contracting Party during an armed conflict.6 4 The Protocol
does allow for the removal of cultural property from an occupied
territory for the purposes of protecting such property against the
dangers of an armed conflict, but it must be returned at the end of
hostilities.65 This was the defense raised by Alfred Rosenberg
throughout his trial. He argued that the removal of cultural
property from the occupied territories was for its protection.66
Article 3 of the 1954 Hague Convention requires States to
safeguard their own cultural property in peacetime and to reduce
the need to remove cultural property from a territory during
wartime. 67 Furthermore, the 1954 Hague Convention has specific
provisions for the transport of cultural property in its Chapter III.68
In World War II, the Nazis transported cultural property in boxcars
from occupied territories to Germany. It is unknown whether this
was to protect it or to appropriate it. The provisions on transport in
the Hague Convention remove this confusion, by providing for the
international supervision of the transport of cultural property under
63. Id. at art. 4(2).
64. Id. at art. 1.
65. Id. at sec. II.
66. Trial of the German Major War Criminals, supra note 29 (the order of the
Fuhrer approving the suggestion was issued at the beginning of July 1940, and
since, in addition to the archives, a great quantity of art treasures, of which
many were imperiled, was found in many mansions, the safe keeping and the
transporting of these treasures into the German Reich was decreed by the
Fuhrer, Direct Examination of Alfred Rosenberg by Dr. Thomas).
67. See The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note
59, at art. 3 (the High Contracting Parties undertake to prepare in time of peace
for the safeguarding of cultural property situated within their own territory
against the foreseeable effects of an armed conflict, by taking such measures as
they consider appropriate).
68. Id. at Chapter III (transport of Cultural Property, Articles 12, 13 and 14,
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict).
[Vol. XIV: I
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its Article 12(2).69
The principle of individual responsibility for violations of
international humanitarian law stemming from the Nuremberg
trials is affirmed in Article 28 of the 1954 Hague Convention." It
provides that High Contracting Parties may undertake all
necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary
sanctions upon those persons who commit, or order to be
committed, a breach of the Convention.7 Article 28 therefore
confers universal jurisdiction to prosecute. The provision does not,
however, provide a list of violations that require a criminal
sanction. Experience of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (hereinafter "ICRC") Advisory Service on Inte mational
Humanitarian Law has shown that such a list is essential if a
coherent and complete system of criminal repression of war crimes
is to be instituted worldwide.72
In addition to the general protection of cultural property
afforded by the 1954 Hague Convention, there is also a system of
special protection provided for in Chapter II of the Convention. It
applies to a limited number of refuges intended to shelter movable
cultural property in the event of armed conflict, as well as to
centers containing monuments and other immovable cultural
property of very great importance.73 It is argued that the
Convention affords extraterritorial protection to this type of
69. Id. at art. 12(2) (Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict; Transport under special protection shall take place
under the international supervision provided for in the aforesaid Regulations and
shall display the distinctive emblem described in Article 16).
70. Id. at art. 28 (Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict; The High Contracting Parties undertake to take,
within the framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps
to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of
whatever nationality, who commit or order to be committed a breach of the
present Convention).
71. Id.
72. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, New Rules for the Protection of Cultural
Property in Armed Conflict, International Review of the Red Cross No. 835.
73. See The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note
59, at art. 8.
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property.74 Article 9 of the 1954 Hague Convention confers
immunity on cultural property under special protection.75 Property
under special protection cannot be used for military purposes,
except in cases of unavoidable military necessity.76
There are major shortcomings to the system of special
protection. First, it is not widely used. Only one center containing
monuments and eight refuges have been listed in the International
Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection as provided
for in Article 8 of the 1954 Hague Convention.77 There are a
number of reasons for this. First, entry on the list is conditional on
the cultural property being situated at an adequate distance from
any large industrial center or military objective." This condition is
almost impossible to fulfill because many of the objects envisioned
for protection are located in cities and are surrounded by military
objectives. In addition, the term 'adequate distance' is not defined
by the Convention. It must be remembered that the Convention
and Protocol were drafted before the development of precision
targeting.
Second, States may object to a proposal for entry into the
International Register. For example, in 1992, Cambodia sought to
register the famous Angor Wat complex. The registration was
74. Victoria A. Birov, Prizes or Plunder? The Pillage of Works of Art and
the International Law of War, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 201, Section C
(1997). Extraterritorial protection would imply that the provision governing
special protection would apply on the territories of States which are not High
Contracting Parties to the Convention.
75. See The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note
59, at art. 9.
76. Id. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict; The High Contracting Parties undertake to ensure the immunity
of cultural property under special protection by refraining, from the time of
entry in the International Register, from any act of hostility directed against such
property and, except for the cases provided for in paragraph 5 of Article 13,
from any use of such property or its surroundings for military purposes.
77. See International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection,
UNESCO Doc. CLT-97/WS/12, August 1997.
78. See The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note
59, at art. 8(1)(a). Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict.
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opposed by Cuba, Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Romania, on the
grounds that they did not recognize the legitimacy of the
Cambodian government.79 Such political barriers to the protection
of cultural property are inconsistent with the view expressed in the
Preamble of the 1954 Hague Convention that cultural property is
the heritage of all mankind. There have been no formal requests
for special protection since the failed Cambodian application.8"
B. Exception to the Convention - Military Necessity
In 1758, immediately following his call for the protection of
cultural property in wartime, Emeric de Vattel wrote:
Nevertheless, if we find it necessary to destroy
edifices of that nature in order to carry on the
operations of war, or to advance the works in a
siege, we have an undoubted right to take such a
step. The sovereign of the country, or his general,
makes no scruple to destroy them, when necessity
or the maxims of war require it. The governor of a
besieged town sets fire to the suburbs, that they may
not afford a lodgment to the besiegers. Nobody
presumes to blame a general who lays waste
gardens, vineyards, or orchards, for the purpose of
encamping on the ground, and throwing up an
entrenchment. If any beautiful production of art be
thereby destroyed, it is an accident, an unhappy
consequence of the war; and the general will not be
blamed, except in those cases when he might have
pitched his camp elsewhere without the smallest
inconvenience to himself.8'
The difficulties with the notion of military necessity in the 1954
79. Birov, supra note 74, at Section B.
80. BOYLAN, supra note 23, at 71.
81. VATTEL, supra note 3, at 168.
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Hague Convention begin with the fact that it is not defined.
Gauging the scope of the concept is therefore problematic. It is
possible to look to the Lieber Code for its meaning because Article
14 of the Lieber Code defines military necessity as, "the necessity
of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of
war, and which are lawful according to the modem usages of
war."
82
The main difference between general and special protection of
cultural property in the 1954 Hague Convention is the military
necessity exception. Protection for cultural property under general
protection can be waived "only in cases where military necessity
imperatively requires such a waiver."83  Immunity can be
withdrawn from cultural property under special protection "only in
exceptional cases of unavoidable military necessity. 84 The
existence of two standards of military necessity, imperative and
unavoidable, would seem to contradict the idea of 'necessity' in its
ordinary meaning. The negotiations at the Diplomatic Conference
that drew up the 1954 Hague Convention clarify to some extent the
intended difference in meaning between the two forms of military
necessity.85 The Secretariat's draft for the Conference states that:
it should here be emphasized that, in using the term
'unavoidable' in connection with special protection,
it was intended to give it a connotation even
82. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., Originally Issued as General Orders
No. 100, Adjutant General's Office, 1863, Washington 1898,
Government Printing Office.
83. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, entered in force: August 7, 1956, at art. 4 para. 2,
available at http://www.icomos.org/hague/hague.convention.html#contents (last
visited Feb. 22, 2004).
84. Id. at art. 11 para. 2 (such necessity can only be established by an officer
commanding a force the equivalent of a division, and the Party withdrawing
immunity must inform the Commissioner-General for cultural property).
85. Jan Hladik, The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the Notion of Military Necessity,
International Review of the Red Cross No. 835, at. 621-635.
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stronger than that implied by the expression
'imperative military necessity' used in Article 4
paragraphs 1 and 2.. .Moreover, it was considered
desirable to avoid a situation in which any officer or
holder of rank whatever might, on the field of
operations, constitute himself the judge of the
unavoidable character of a given military
necessity.86
It has already been noted that very few cultural objects benefit
from special protection. The stricter requirements for special
protection only serve to widen the scope of interpretation for
imperative military necessity. During the 1954 Diplomatic
Conference discussions, some States wished to exclude the
exception, arguing that it would open the door to abuses.8 7 Also,
the lack of a proper definition invites its misapplication.88 The
exception was already anachronistic at the time of the drafting of
the 1954 Hague Convention.89 The Roerich Pact of 1935 required
unconditional protection for cultural property and contained no
exception in cases of military necessity.9" More importantly, the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 demanded absolute compliance with
their norms "in all circumstances."'" The USSR, France, Greece
and Spain opposed the exception. By including the exception in
the 1954 Hague Convention, the parties took a step backward in
86. Records of the Conference convened by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization held at The Hague from April 21 to May
14, 1954, published by the Government of the Netherlands, the Hague, 1961, at
310.
87. Id.
88. Birov, supra note 74, at pt. IV.
89. Id.
90. Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and
Historic Monuments, (or 'Roerich Pact'), April 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267 T.S.
No.889, at art. 1 (the Treaty was named after a Russian painter, poet and activist
on behalf of cultural preservation, whose draft for the Convention was in large
part adopted by the nations of North and South America).
91. Article 46 Geneva I, Article 47 Geneva II, Article 13 Geneva Il1, and
Article 33 Geneva IV.
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the development of international humanitarian law.92
Today, the exception is no longer required because of modem
weapons technology and the resulting reduction of collateral
damage. There is also no requirement of proportionality.93 If a
single sniper was seen in a cathedral, the destruction of the entire
cathedral would be justified. This was a situation realized in
former Yugoslavia. It is further problematic that there is no
requirement in the 1954 Hague Convention as to who decides what
is meant by imperative military necessity. Eisenhower once stated
during fighting in Italy that: "the phrase 'military necessity' is
sometimes used where it would be more truthful to speak of
military convenience or even of personal convenience. 94 This
broad interpretation resulted in the abuse of the notion of military
necessity during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
SECTION III - THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
The shelling of the city of Dubrovnik of the former Yugoslavia
highlights the ineffectiveness of the 1954 Hague Convention.
Thirty percent of the city's historic center was destroyed in the
attacks of December 6, 1991.9" Nickola Obujen, mayor of
Dubrovnik, made a statement regarding the destruction to the
international press:
We had UN and UNESCO flags flying from our
ramparts.. .We were on the lists of world heritage
sites, had been for years. We were covered by the
Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, two
men from UNESCO in Paris had been sent there
especially to observe. But nobody could stop it. I
92. Birov, supra note 74, at Part IV.
93. Id.
94. BOYLAN, supra note 23, at 22.
95. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 789, Destruction of Cultural Property
Annex 1I, UN Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. V) (1994), at 7.
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must say, we were disappointed in the world.96
Yugoslavia was a High Contracting Party of the 1954 Hague
Convention. Under Article 19 of the 1954 Hague Convention, "in
the event of an armed conflict not of an international character
occurring within the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum, the provisions of the present Convention which relate to
respect for cultural property." 97  The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter "ICTY") in ICTY
v. Tadic9" ruled that Article 19 of the 1954 Hague Convention had
been incorporated into the customary law of war.99 The U.N.
96. Amy E. Schwartz, Can We Shield Art From War?, The Washington Post,
June 23, 1993, at AI7.
97. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 59, at art.
19.
98. M. CherifBassiouni, The Institute for Global Legal Studies Colloquium:
The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: Appraising UN Justice-Related
Fact-Finding Mission, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 35 (2001) (in 1992, the UN
Security Council established one of the most significant fact-finding missions in
UN history, the Yugoslavia Commission, which preceded the establishment of
the ICTY, pursuant to Resolution 780 [S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess. at
2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992).] The Commission received the broadest
mandate since the establishment of the IMT at Nuremberg, but received no
funding from the UN to conduct its investigations. Its final report, which at over
3,300 pages was the longest ever made by the Security Council, was completed
with funding from private sources, voluntary contributions from States, and
ultimately DePaul University, Chicago, where its database was established. The
Commission's work gave the UN Security Council the basis to establish the
ICTY pursuant to Resolution 808 [U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993)].
99. Lippman, supra note 19, at pt. X; See also International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, (Appellate
Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995), 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996), at para. 98 (the emergence of
international rules governing internal strife has occurred at two different levels:
at the level of customary law and at that of treaty law. Two bodies of rules have
thus crystallized, which are by no means conflicting or inconsistent, but instead
mutually support and supplement each other. Indeed, the interplay between
these two sets of rules is such that some treaty rules have gradually become part
of customary law. This holds true for common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
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Security Council established the ICTY by its Resolution 808 of
February 1993 "to investigate and act on allegations of 'grave
breaches and other violations of international humanitarian
law ... including... destruction of cultural and religious
property...,10o
The Director-General of UNESCO appealed to all sides to
respect cultural property at the outset of the war but his call went
unheeded.'' Indeed, it is clear that cultural property was the
subject of deliberate attack throughout the conflict."2 In response
to charges of deliberate destruction of cultural property, the
Yugoslav federal government claimed its attacks were justified
under military necessity."3 Similarly, the Serbs cited the defense of
imperative military necessity for the shelling of Dubrovnik."4
They claimed that Croats were using buildings in the city center
for military purposes. Such use is prohibited by the 1954 Hague
Convention under the requirement of respect for cultural property
contained in Article 4.105
Three months prior to the shelling, Croatia called on the then
Director-General of UNESCO, Federico Mayer, to assist in the
organization of protection for cultural property in the region, under
Article 23 of the 1954 Hague Convention. 6 Mayer sent a mission
Conventions, as was authoritatively held by the International Court of Justice
(Nicaragua Case, at 218), but also applies to Article 19 of the Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May
14, 1954, and to the core of Additional Protocol II of 1977).
100. BOYLAN, supra note 23, at para. 2.82.
101. UNESCO Director-General, Federico Mayer, Calls For Respect for
Yugoslav Cultural Heritage, UNESCOPRESSE, October 4, 1991.
102. KAREN J. DETLING, ETERNAL SILENCE: THE DESTRUCTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY IN YUGOSLAVIA, (1993).
103. Id.
104. Birov, supra note 74, at sec. B pt. II.
105. DETLING, supra note 102, at pt. VI -Conclusion.
106. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 59, at art.
23 para. 1 (the High Contracting Parties may call upon UNESCO for technical
assistance in organizing the protection of their cultural property, or in
connection with any other problem arising out of the application of the present
Convention or the Regulations for its execution. The Organization shall accord
such assistance within the limits fixed by its program and resources).
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to Yugoslavia in October 1991. At the conclusion of the mission in
the following month, two permanent observers were sent to
Dubrovnik. They arrived just in time to witness the destruction. As
one commentator stated, "they served only to catalogue the
atrocities.""0 7
The destruction in Dubrovnik is the most significant example of
the widespread targeting of cultural property in the former
Yugoslavia. In another illustration, Council of Europe Report
highlights. the deliberate destruction of mosques in the eastern
Gradacac front."0 8 The entire town of Gradacac was badly
damaged. The Report points to "a certain amount of deliberate
targeting" 109 of religious structures within the town. This practice
of targeting religious and cultural property was part of a campaign
of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. The Council of Europe described the
process as "cultural cleansing.""' However, since the protection
afforded by the 1954 Hague Convention does not extend to local
religious sites, much of the targeting was not in violation of the
1954 Convention. "'
The sixteenth century fortress at Stara Gradiska on the Sava
River, the Mostar Bridge, the historic center of Sarajevo, the
Roman villas at Split, and four-thousand-year-old archaeological
sites at Vuhovar are all properties of international importance that
were damaged in a campaign aimed at local populations. Federico
Mayer, former Director-General of UNESCO, stated "we have
seen in years how, particularly in areas where the assault on the
heritage has been brutal, that this assault is part of the attack on the
107. Dubrovnik's Black Friday: UNESCO Observers Eyewitness Account,
UNESCOPRESSE, February 7, 1992.
108. Report on a Fact-finding Mission on the Situation of the Cultural
Heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, June 1994, at 8 Eur. Parl. Ass. Rp.
Doc. AS/CULT/AA n.38.
109. Id. at 42.
110. Id. at22.
111. See Gregory M. Mose, The Destruction of Churches and Mosques in
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Seeking a Rights-based Approach to the Protection of
Religious Cultural Property, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 180 (1996) (commentators have
argued for the inclusion of religious property under the protection of the 1954
Hague Convention).
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peoples themselves." '112 Many of these buildings were flying the
blue and white flag of Article 17 described in the 1954 Hague
Convention."3 There is some suggestion that the flag served as an
incentive for attack." 1
4
The Commission of Experts appointed by the UN Security
Council to investigate events in the former Yugoslavia considered
the destruction of Dubrovnik and the Mostar Bridge as grave
breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention."5 The Mostar Bridge
linked the Muslim and Croat communities in Mostar and was a
symbol of the cross-cultural character of Bosnia and
Herzegovina."6 Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
considers the extensive destruction of property not justified by
military necessity to be a grave breach of the Convention."17
112. Director-General of UNESCO, Federico Mayer, address at the opening
of the Diplomatic Conference Concerning the Second Protocol to the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, The Hague (Mar. 15, 1999).
113. The distinctive emblem of the 1954 Hague Convention takes the form
of a shield, consisting of a royal blue square, one of the angles of which forms
the point of the shield, and of a royal-blue triangle above the square, the space
on either side being taken up by a white triangle. According to Article 17, the
distinctive emblem repeated three times may be used only as means of
identification of (a) immovable cultural property under special protection; (b)
the transport of cultural property under the conditions provided for in Articles
12 and 13; and (c) improvised refuges, under the conditions provided for in the
Regulations for the execution of the Convention.
114. Birov, supra note 74, at Section B Part II (monuments flying the large
blue and white flag of the 1954 Hague Convention were intentionally attacked).
115. Lippman, supra note 19, at Part X (Final Report of the United Nations
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
789, Destruction of Cultural Property (Annex II), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/ Add. 2
(Vol. V) (1994)).
116. Id.
117. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time
of War, art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be
those involving any of the following acts, if committed against
persons or property protected by the present Convention:
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or
[Vol. XIV: I
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Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, both high profile cases,
have been indicted for the destruction of cultural property in
former Yugoslavia by the ICTY. The original indictment reads:
Since April 1992 to the end of May 1995, in the
territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
controlled by the Bosnian Serb military and police,
including areas where no military conflict was
ongoing, there has been widespread and systematic
damage to and destruction of Muslim and Roman
Catholic sacred sites."8
The indictment states that by these acts and omissions, Radovan
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic committed a violation of the laws or
customs of war (destruction or willful damage to institutions
dedicated to religion) as recognized by Articles 3(d), 7(1) and 7(3)
of the statute of the Tribunal." 9
serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person,
compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a
hostile Power, or willfully depriving a protected person of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present
Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
118. Original Indictment of Mladic and Karadzic, UN International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, July 25, 1995.
119. Id. at Count 6 (Destruction of Sacred Sites), para. 39 (Article 3(d) states
that seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and
works of art and science; Article 7(1) states that a person who planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the present
Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime; and Article 7(3) holds
that the fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the present
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about
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The 1954 Hague Convention, according to Article 1, only
applies to property "of great importance to the cultural heritage of
every people." 2' This strict adherence to the 'cultural
internationalist' 2" approach can be seen as inadequate with respect
to religious property in the former Yugoslavia, such as the Muslim
and Roman Catholic sacred sites referenced in the Karadzic and
Mladic indictment. The "institutions dedicated to religion" covered
by Article 3(d) of the ICTY statute would not be covered by
Article 1 of the 1954 Hague Convention for they are not of
international significance. By focusing on the heritage of all
mankind, it becomes easy to disregard the needs of the
communities that the property in question was originally designed
to serve.'22 While this is undoubtedly an issue, it could also be
argued that rather than trying to extend the ambit of the
Convention, it would be more useful to focus on the enforcement
of its current provisions.
Just as the 1907 Hague Regulations were shown to be
inadequate during World Wars I and II, the 1954 Hague
Convention was proven inadequate by the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia. The 1954 Hague Convention was not adhered to in
practice; therefore, the problems clearly rested with enforcing the
Convention and the doctrine of military necessity. Without an
adequate enforcement mechanism, its provisions are largely
theoretical. The widespread abuse of the notion of imperative
military necessity coupled with the inability to enforce sanctions
enabled the systematic cultural cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.
This conflict has forced the international community to address
these two main weaknesses of the 1954 Hague Convention.
to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof).
120. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 59, at art.
1.
121. Mose, supra note 111, at 89 ("Cultural internationalism..." thus
countries serve merely as custodians of cultural property found within their
borders).
122. Id. at pt. IV.
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SECTION IV - THE SECOND PROTOCOL TO THE 1954 HAGUE
CONVENTION
In 1991, the Netherlands issued a review of the 1954 Hague
Convention. 23 As a consequence of this initiative, the Director-
General of UNESCO formally commissioned a review of the
Convention.124 Professor Patrick Boylan of the International
Council for Museums was appointed to carry out the task to
identify measures for improving the 1954 Hague Convention. 25
The review was published in 1993, and made a number of
recommendations. 126  The Government of the Netherlands
compiled these recommendations into a new draft treaty called the
Lauswolt Document.127 Twenty governmental experts in 1997 at
UNESCO headquarters in Paris examined this document.1 28 A
notable omission from the document was the recommended
change in the military necessity exception. Several of the
governments objected to this omission. 129 In 1997, the Government
of the Netherlands offered to host a Diplomatic Conference to
transform the Lauswolt Document into an international treaty. 30
There were two further meetings of governmental experts
representing the States party to the 1954 Hague Convention and a
final preparatory meeting in Vienna in May 1998.131 That meeting
identified five key areas to be addressed by the Second Protocol:
(1) the institutional aspects, (2) the precautionary measures to be
taken in peacetime, (3) the 'military necessity' exception, (4) the
system of special protection, and (5) individual criminal
123. Review of the application of the Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 1954), UNESCO
doc. 140 EX/26, Paris, September 11, 1992, at 6.
124. BOYLAN, supra note 23, at 19.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Hladik, supra note 85.
128. Henckaerts, supra note 72.
129. For example, Croatia, Czech Republic and Slovenia, all of whom
wished to see the exception removed completely.
130. Henckaerts, supra note 72.
131. Id.
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responsibility. 13
2
The. Diplomatic Conference on the Second Protocol to the
Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict took place in The Hague from
March 15 to 26, 1999, and resulted in the adoption of the Second
Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention. The Second Protocol
supplements the 1954 Hague Convention and only applies to the
States that ratified it.
A significant institutional development was the creation, under
Article 24 of the Second Protocol, of the Committee for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. It
is composed of twelve experts, qualified in the fields of cultural
heritage, defense or international law. The members are elected by
the State Parties, according to the equitable geographical
distribution principle, whereby members are representative of the
different regions and cultures of the world. 133 The functions of the
Committee include developing guidelines for the implementation
of the Second Protocol, granting, suspending or canceling
enhanced protection for cultural property and establishing,
maintaining and promoting the list of cultural property under
enhanced protection.' 34 The Second Protocol states in its Article
37(2) that State Parties must submit a Report to the Committee,
every four years, on the implementation of its provisions.
The Committee is charged with, among other duties, the
management of a fund based on voluntary contributions from State
Parties for the protection of cultural property, notably peacetime
preparatory work.135 Furthermore, there are specific guidelines as
to what measures States can take in peacetime. This is in contrast
to the 1954 Hague Convention which expressed the requirement
132. Id.
167. Id. at art. 24(3).
168. Id. at art. 27.
135. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, March 26, 1999, art. 29,
available at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/hague/html-eng/protocol2.shtml (last
visited Feb. 22, 2004).
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that States take such measures as they consider appropriate, but it
did not provide any further guidance.'36 The measures contained in
the Second Protocol include the preparation of inventories, the
planning of emergency measures, and the preparation for the
removal of movable cultural property.'37
Professor Boylan identified the lack of a definition of military
necessity contained in Article 4 of the 1954 Hague Convention as
a serious weakness in the protection afforded to cultural
property.' While the Second Protocol was an addition to the
Convention and could not remove the concept entirely, it
nevertheless sought to add meaning and substance to the concept
to prevent its abuse.
The approach taken in the Second Protocol as it relates to the
1954 Hague Convention mirrored that of the 1977 Additional
Protocol I as it relates to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Attacks
were to be limited to military objectives.'39 This concept is codified
in Article 52 (2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol 1.140 Such an
approach allows necessary attacks within strict humanitarian
limits. States that are not party to the 1977 Additional Protocol I,
including the United States, affirmed the customary law nature of
the provision regarding military objective during the 1999
Diplomatic Conference on the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague
Convention.' 4' This illustrates how the 1999 Conference sought to
136. Id. at art. 3.
137. Id. at art. 5.
138. BOYLAN, supra note 23, at 54.
139. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 133, at art. 6.
140. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I), art. 52(2), June 8, 1977:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far
as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.
141. Henckaerts, supra note 72 at 4.
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reaffirm certain rules of humanitarian law while developing new
rules. '42
There are two clear criteria to the concept of military objective
that emerged at the 1977 Diplomatic Conference on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts.'43 First, the nature, location,
purpose or use of the object has to be such that it makes an
effective contribution to military action. Second, the military
advantage has to be definite in the circumstances ruling at the
time. The concept, therefore, incorporates the idea of military
necessity and balances it with humanitarian needs.
The Second Protocol also clarified the meaning of 'imperative'
as it relates to military necessity and requires that no other
alternative exist.'" The decision maker of a situation of imperative
military necessity must be an officer commanding a force
equivalent to a battalion or smaller if circumstances do not permit
otherwise.'45 Protection is enhanced because the notion of military
objective is used to define the exception of military necessity. The
rule that only military objectives can be targeted is now part of
military manuals and military training worldwide.'46
While cultural property cannot be a military objective because
of its nature or purpose, there was some debate at the 1999
Conference on the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of
1954 concerning the issue of the location of cultural property.
Article 27 of the 1907 Hague Regulations makes it clear that what
turns property into a military objective is not its location but its
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 133, at art.
6(a)(ii) (a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity may only be
invoked to direct an act of hostility against cultural property when and for as
long as... there is no feasible alternative available to obtain a similar military
advantage to that offered by directing an act of hostility against that objective).
145. Id. at art. 6(c) (the decision to invoke imperative military necessity shall
only be taken by an officer commanding a force the equivalent of a battalion in
size or larger, or a force smaller in size where circumstances do not permit
otherwise).
146. Henckaerts, supra note 72, at 5.
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use. "'47 The idea of 'use' was addressed by the word 'function' in
the Second Protocol.'48 The principle remains the same: the general
protection governing cultural property may be waived if that
property has, by its 'function', become a military objective.
However, Article 13 of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague
Convention, governing the loss of enhanced protection for cultural
property, states that such protection may be suspended when the
property has, by its 'use' become a military objective.'49 Thus, is
there a lower standard implied in the word 'function'? Or could
'function' contain the idea of location, so that, for example, if a
cultural object such as a historic wall was blocking the path of an
army, could it be destroyed because it is functioning, by its
location, as a military objective? 5 ° It is only by a stretch of the
imagination that 'function' could cover location.'' The word
'function' clearly requires an active role on the part of the holder
of the cultural property. The property could only be made into a
military objective through use. Indeed, the diplomats have been
criticized for confusing the issue with examples that bear little
relation to the reality on the battlefield. 52 The mere location of
pyramids in Egypt or temples in Greece could never serve as a
pretext to attack those objects. The overall consistency and clarity
of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention regarding
the meaning and scope of imperative military necessity ought to
147. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The
Hague, art. 27, Oct. 18, 1907 (all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far
as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes,
historic monuments... provided they are not being used at the time for military
purposes).
148. Id. at art. 6(a) (a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity
pursuant to Article 4 Paragraph 2 of the Convention may only be invoked to
direct an act of hostility against cultural property when and for as long as: (i)
that cultural property has, by its function, been made into a military objective)
149. Id. at art. 13(l)(a).
150. This specific example given by the Canadian delegation at the 1999
Diplomatic Conference.
151. Henckaerts, supra note 72, at 6.
152. Id. at 7.
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have been the priority.
The most significant change to the 1954 Hague Convention has
been the creation of the system of enhanced protection for cultural
property that effectively replaces the old system of special
protection. The inadequacies of the system of special protection
contained in the 1954 Hague Convention have been outlined in
this paper. The Second Protocol removes the requirements of
distance from an industrial center or military objective in line with
the development of technology that allows for more accurate
targeting.'53 Also, the means of lodging objections to applications
have been curtailed in order to de-politicize the process of
protection.154 These changes are a clear response to events in the
former Yugoslavia. Dubrovnik's presence on the list of World
Heritage Sites contributed towards helping to preserve its historic
center and it further defines what is considered under enhanced
protection. Cultural property under enhanced protection loses its
protection if it has, "by its use, becomes a military objective."' 15
This is a clear improvement on the requirement of unavoidable
military necessity. In fact, the difference between cultural property
under enhanced protection and cultural property under general
protection can now be confirmed.
153. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 59,
at art. 8(l)(a):
That there may be placed under special protection a limited
number of refuges intended to shelter movable cultural
property in the event of armed conflict provided that they are
situated at an adequate distance from any large industrial enter
or from any important military objective constituting a
vulnerable point, such as, for example, an aerodrome,
broadcasting station, establishment engaged upon work of
national defense, a port or railway station of relative
importance or a main line of communication.
154. Regulations for the Execution of the 1954 Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, at art. 14 (any High
Contracting Party may, by letter addressed to the Director-General of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, lodge an objection to
the registration of cultural property).
155. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 133, at art.
13(l)(b).
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The 1954 Hague Convention seemed to imply a lower standard
of protection for cultural property under general protection than for
cultural property under special protection. However, the Second
Protocol makes it clear that there is no higher standard of
protection for cultural property under enhanced protection. 156 Both
are protected unless, by their use or function, they become military
objectives. So what then is the difference between them? The
difference lies with the defender's obligations rather than with the
attacker's. The defender has the right to convert cultural property
under general protection into a military objective by its function.
In the case of enhanced protection, the defender has no right to
convert it into a military objective. Destruction of cultural property
on lists like the World Heritage list that are under enhanced
protection, is a serious violation of the Second Protocol. 157
While the 1954 Hague Convention provided for individual
criminal responsibility for breaches of the Convention, the
effectiveness of such a provision was undermined by the lack of a
list of specific offenses that could give rise to criminal sanctions.
The Second Protocol develops international humanitarian law in
this respect by detailing five acts that constitute serious violations
under its Article 15: (1) making cultural property under enhanced
protection the object of attack, (2) using cultural property under
enhanced protection or its immediate surrounding in support of an
action, (3) extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural
property protected under the Convention and Protocol II, (4)
making cultural property protected under the Convention and
Protocol II the object of attack, and (5) theft, pillage or
misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed against, cultural
property protected under the Convention.' 58
The first three offenses listed in Article 15 of the Second
Protocol correspond to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
156. There are minor differences in the level of command at which an attack
can be ordered.
157. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 133, at art. 15
(such an offence would correspond to a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions).
158. Id.
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and Additional Protocol I of 1977. "1 The last two are considered
to be serious violations of the 1954 Hague Convention and Second
Protocol. 6 They were recognized as war crimes by the Statute of
the International Criminal Court (hereinafter "ICC"), and were
included at the suggestion of the ICRC.' 6' The ICRC sought to
ensure that the two offenses would result in prosecutions for war
crimes by specifically providing for such action. The principle of
permissive universal jurisdiction for war crimes applies to these
offenses since States may establish universal jurisdiction, but are
not compelled to do so.'62
There is a duty upon State Parties to the Second Protocol to
introduce domestic legislation providing for the punishment for the
above offenses. 63 Also, there is a duty on State Parties to try
persons charged with these offenses under the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction. This means that jurisdiction must be established even
when an offense is committed by a non-national, outside the
territory of the State, if the suspected offender is present within the
State's boundaries. The Chairman of the Working Group on
Chapter IV of the Second Protocol described these provisions as a
major achievement, as all elements to form a coherent system of
prosecution and extradition are included."M The Second Protocol
also develops international humanitarian law in that it provides a
balance between the criminal responsibility of both the attacker
and the defender, whereas the Additional Protocol I of 1977
assigned responsibility only to the attacker.'65
The United States succeeded in its application for an exception
to universal jurisdiction for nationals not party to the Second
159. Henckaerts, supra note 72, at 11.
160. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 133, at art. 15
(Serious Violations of this Protocol).
161. Henckaerts, supra note 72, at 11.
162. Id. at 12.
163. Id. at art. 17.
164. Horst Fischer, Presentation of the Results of the Working Group on
Chapter 4, UNESCO Doc. HC/1999/INF.5, March 25, 1999, at 2.
165. Henckaerts, supra note 72, at 11.
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Protocol.'66 However, the effect of this exception has been softened
and the States may establish jurisdiction over such nationals under
applicable national law or customary international law.
The Second Protocol also outlined the precautionary measures to
attack to be taken by State Parties in its Article 7.167 In addition to
doing everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be
attacked are not cultural property protected under Article 4 of the
Convention, the provision requires that each Party to the conflict
take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental damage to cultural property protected. 168 State Parties
must refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be
expected to cause incidental damage to cultural property which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.
69
The Second Protocol, like the 1954 Hague Convention, applies
to both international and non-international conflicts. 70 The Statute
166. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 133, at art.
16(2)(b):
Except in so far as a State which is not Party to this Protocol
may accept and apply its provisions in accordance with Article
3 paragraph 2, members of the armed forces and nationals of a
State which is not Party to this Protocol, except for those
nationals serving in the armed forces of a State which is a
Party to this Protocol, do not incur individual criminal
responsibility by virtue of this Protocol, nor does this Protocol
impose an obligation to establish jurisdiction over such
persons or to extradite them.
167. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 133, at art. 7
168. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 133, at art. 7(a)
and (b).
169. Id. at art.7(c). Furthermore, under Article 7(d)(i) and (ii), an attack
must be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is
cultural property protected under Article 4 of the Convention, or that that the
attack may be expected to cause incidental damage to cultural property which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.
170. The Convention on Cultural Property, supra note 59, at art. 19; Second
Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 133 at art. 4.
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of the ICC gives the ICC jurisdiction over war crimes committed
against cultural property in both international and non-
international conflicts.'71 As mentioned, the initiative for the
Second Protocol came largely out of the destruction of cultural
property during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Cultural
property is considered the "heritage of all mankind."'72 The Second
Protocol confirms this cultural internationalist approach to cultural
property protection.
The major shortcomings of the 1954 Hague Convention
identified by Professor Boylan were examined and effectively
resolved by the Second Protocol. The institutional aspects and the
precautionary measures to be taken in peacetime were addressed.
The Convention as it pertains to the 'military necessity exception'
was brought into line with major developments in international
humanitarian law, notably the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. The flawed regime of special protection was
supplemented and effectively replaced by a more sophisticated
regime of enhanced protection. The Second Protocol provides a
list of specific offenses that could give rise to individual criminal
sanctions, strengthening the enforcement mechanisms of the 1954
Hague Convention.
CONCLUSION
Respect for another's cultural heritage is respect for
171. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9, July 17, 1998, at art. 8(2)(e)(iv):
War crimes means other serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international
character within the established framework of international
law, namely... Intentionally directing attacks against
buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or
charitable purposes historic monuments, hospitals and places
where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are
not military objectives.
172. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 59,
at Preamble (being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any
people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind).
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our joint humanity. It is the thread of our common
being, an achievement of peacetime, a reminder that
conflict, however terrible, is transient and will end
with a return to calm and the chance to build a
lasting culture of peace.'73
While each successive instrument of international law governing
the protection of cultural property has addressed the shortcomings
of its predecessor, the similarity running through all of the
legislation is that it has not succeeded in preventing the
widespread destruction of cultural property when armed conflicts
occur. There are two conclusions that can be drawn from this.
The first is that the legislation is not effective enough. The
Hague Regulations were inadequate when faced with the
systematic looting of art treasures by the Nazis. At the Nuremberg
trials, it was declared that the protection of cultural property
formed part of customary international law. Nevertheless, there
was still no coherent system of protection. The subsequent 1954
Hague Convention addressed this problem; however, difficulties
remained with the enforcement of its provisions. The military
necessity exception, coupled with the lack of a specific list of
violations that would give rise to criminal sanctions, meant that the
Convention proved unable to cope with grave instances of
violations, particularly in relation to the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia. The Second Protocol addresses these shortcomings,
and it would seem that now cultural property will be effectively
protected. The preservation of cultural property will be achieved
through enforcement and implementation of the international
norms.
The Second Protocol came into effect on March 9, 2004.
UNESCO Director-General Koichiro Matsuura welcomed the fact
that the Second Protocol "comes into force just as the international
community is celebrating the half-century of the Convention's
173. Former Director-General of UNESCO, Federico Mayer, address at the
opening of the Diplomatic Conference Concerning the Second Protocol to the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, The Hague (Mar. 15, 1999).
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existence.' 174 Twenty years earlier, at the thirtieth anniversary of
the 1954 Hague Convention, UNESCO cited High Contracting
Party apathy as the major defect in the Convention. 75 If this is still
the case, the Second Protocol will have little effect, not because its
rules are not strong enough, but because the interest is not there.
Nevertheless, extensive media coverage in April 2003 of the
national and international efforts to guard the contents of the
Baghdad Museum against looters would suggest that the world
maintains a keen interest in protecting cultural heritage in wartime.
Perhaps international legislation has not protected cultural
property in time of conflict because more of the focus is on the
protection of lives. This is the reality of war, and despite the
protection provided by international humanitarian law, war is
always accompanied by a breakdown in the social and legal
structure of the State. International humanitarian law seeks to
ensure that minimum standards are observed. Similarly, the 1954
Hague Convention and its Protocols represent minimum
protections for cultural property. If war cannot be prevented, it
may seem that the destruction of cultural property cannot be
prevented. Nevertheless, it is hoped that as international
humanitarian law incrementally erodes the impunity of wartime,
the regime governing cultural property will equally gain wider
acceptance.
174. A New International Instrument to Enhance the Protection of Cultural
Property in Times of War, UNESCOPRESSE March 9, 2004.
175. Information on the Implementation of the Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1984), at 8.
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